

Beyond State Capacity: Bureaucratic Performance, Policy Implementation, and Reform

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Abstract

Three decades of research have generated a consensus that state capacity is central to economic and social development. While the concept originated in macro-historical and comparative analysis, it has become a default term for discussing the performance of government bureaucracies. This paper discusses the limitations to conceiving of narrower questions of bureaucratic performance and policy implementation using the broad, aggregate concept of capacity. Capacity refers to bureaucracies' hypothetical potential, but this usually differs from their actual actions due to organizations' collective nature and the constraints and uncertainty imposed by their multiple political principals. While capacity is a convenient shorthand term for a wide range of factors, it achieves this by abstracting away from the actual mechanisms of bureaucratic action. Analysis should instead: focus on bureaucracies' collective nature rather than abstract from it; engage with contextual specificity and contingency; and focus measurement and reform efforts on performance rather than hypothetical capacity.

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People (i.e., individuals) have goals; collectivities of people do not.

- Cyert and March (1963, 30)

Congress Is a “They”, Not an “It”

- Shepsle (1992, 239)

1 Introduction

State capacity - the ability of the state bureaucracy to implement government's policy choices - has become one of the most influential concepts in research on international development. The sprawling research program originated in the effort to push analysis beyond analysis of politics and policy decisions into the realm of logistics, power, and implementation of these decisions (Mann 1984, Skocpol 1985). The key theoretical and empirical questions were macro-historical: explaining why and how strong security and administrative bureaucracies developed in some states but not in others. While an active literature still debates the conceptualization, measurement, historical determinants, and consequences of state capacity's development across countries and regions, a measure of the success of this literature is that few scholars would now contest that strong, capable states are central

to processes of long-run development (Englehart 2009; Besley and Persson 2011; Lee *et al* 2014; Harbers 2015; Soifer 2015; Centeno *et al* 2017).

At the same time as this research program has been examining the relationship between state capacity and socioeconomic outcomes at an aggregate level, a related set of concerns around the quality of government bureaucracies has become increasingly prominent in more narrowly focused research on particular bureaucracies or policies and in development practice. These efforts often appeal to the theoretical apparatus and terminology of capacity, perhaps in part due to the success and intellectual influence of the macro-historical and cross-country state capacity literature and the concept's malleability. For example, institutional reform is often referred to as a matter of building capacity or capability (Teskey 2012; Andrews *et al* 2017), impact evaluations are framed as evaluating the effects of state capacity through specific programs (Muralidharan *et al* 2016), research on the implementation of particular laws or policies is analyzed as a matter of capacity (e.g. Hills 2007, Baker 2009), and government organizations' capacity is measured by aggregating personnel indicators (Gingerich 2013; Bersch *et al* 2016). How consequential is this shift from using capacity as a macro-historical concept to examine the relationships between aggregate outcomes and broad measures of state quality to using capacity as a theoretical lens for narrower questions of bureaucratic performance, policy implementation, and reform?

This paper argues that the farther one moves away from the broad, aggregate abstraction of the original macro-historical concept towards the discussion of specific bureaucracies, policies or reforms, the less useful the concept of state capacity becomes for understanding the functioning or reform of

government bureaucracies. While the metaphor of capacity is intuitive and appealing, when applied to specific organizations or policies it misrepresents the *mechanisms* of bureaucratic performance and policy implementation and obscures the *contingency* of performance and implementation on the details of politics, policies, and contexts. The term misrepresents the mechanisms of bureaucratic performance because it conceives of bureaucratic action in terms of a bureaucracy's hypothetical ability to implement policies. While the notional potential of a bureaucracy to implement policy may be equivalent to its actual performance in the simplest case of a unitary agent implementing well-defined policy choices to the best of its ability, the dominant feature of actually existing bureaucracies is that they are composed of and directed by a *multiplicity of actors*. Organizations are collectivities composed of many agents with different preferences and incentives, and their efficient operation depends largely on resolving the resulting problems of information and incentives (Garicano and Rayo 2016) and credibility and clarity (Gibbons and Henderson 2013). Similarly, government policy decisions are not the unambiguous command of a single political principal, but are unstable and incomplete expressions of constantly shifting collective choices among multiple political principals (Wilson 1989; Shepsle 1992).¹

While individuals may thus be said to have specific capacities, conceiving of organizations as having capacities obscures perhaps the most salient characteristic of organizations: that they are collective actors. As Shepsle (2002,

¹Other authors (e.g. Centeno *et al* 2017) have previously noted the distinction between state capacity and whether or how a political principle chooses to use that capacity. Throughout the article, I take this distinction for granted, and focus instead on the implications of multiple political principals for bureaucracies even after a policy decision has been made.

339) writes in his classic polemic against the concept of legislative intent, another widely used term that is not grounded in a rigorous understanding of collective behavior: “To claim otherwise is to entertain a myth...or commit a fallacy (the false personification of a collectivity).” Analyzing issues like bureaucratic performance, policy implementation, and reform through the lens of capacity also obscures their highly contingent nature. Capacity is a convenient shorthand for the complex array of factors that determines whether and how a particular policy is likely to be implemented in a specific case, but it achieves this convenience by abstracting away from the mechanisms that are critical for understanding and improving bureaucratic performance and policy implementation. Framing analysis of policy implementation and performance as a matter of capacity focuses attention on a metaphor at the cost of abstracting away from the most salient features of the causal mechanisms that drive bureaucratic performance at both the organizational and political levels.

How should scholars and practitioners approach these questions, if not as questions of capacity? The answer is not to simply substitute in another catch-all term to capture a similar underlying concept; to do so would be to focus on semantics rather than real conceptual issues. Instead, this paper suggests three (non-exclusive) approaches. First, research on organizational performance and reform should explicitly engage with the implications of bureaucracies being collective actors under multiple principals. Second, analysis must engage directly with the contingency and specificity of policy implementation, which is not well represented by a single unidimensional construct that is assumed to be fixed at the national, sub-national, or even organizational

level. Finally, work on these topics should carefully distinguish between actual actions and hypothetical potentials: whereas retrospective performance can be measured, discussions of prospective capacity are inherently speculative.

Although this paper critiques much of the conceptual slippage that has been associated with state capacity, it does not call for the concept's abandonment or denigrate the numerous excellent studies that have advanced our understanding of the historical and comparative development of state capacity (e.g. Soifer 2015, Andrews *et al* 2017, Centeno *et al* 2017). Rather, the paper calls attention to a common trade-off for theory: a concept designed for analysis at high levels of abstraction is likely to be less suited for less abstract and more specific questions (and vice versa). The same aggregation and acontextuality that make state capacity such a powerful concept for studying the types of questions for which it was intended also inherently limit its application to the narrower questions of bureaucratic performance, policy implementation, and reform to which it has been increasingly applied.

Recognizing this limitation opens space for developing and connecting other theoretical approaches to these issues. For example, engaging with the complexities of policy implementation can help scholars better understand successful bureaucracies in poor countries with generally weak states (Tendler 1997, Leonard 2010) as well as the numerous high-profile implementation failures in rich countries thought to have capable states (Dunleavy 1995), and begin to disaggregate theories of implementation and bureaucratic performance (Pepinsky *et al* 2017). It would also connect more directly to the questions of efficiency and organizational dynamics that are the focus

of much of the rich micro-level literature on bureaucratic performance from organizational economics and organization theory (Cyert and March 1963, Leibenstein 1966, Schein 1985, Gibbons and Henderson 2013), and to political science literature on legislative bargaining (Weingast and Marshall 1988) and political control of the bureaucracy (Whitford 2005). Ultimately, this process could lead to a clearer articulation of the connections between micro-level theories of bureaucracy and implementation and the macro-historical literature on state formation from which the concept of state capacity originated and spread.

The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the origins and development of state capacity in the macro-historical literature, and Section 3 describes the concept's slippage into narrower, more applied areas of research and practice. Sections 4 and 5 show how the multiplicity of bureaucratic agents and political principals, respectively, undermine this view of the mechanisms of policy implementation and policy choice in government bureaucracies. Section 6 discusses three ways in which scholars and policymakers can respond to these critiques, and Section 7 concludes.

2 The Concept of State Capacity

The term state capacity is used for a wide range of purposes by different authors, but this definitional diversity masks some key features that are common to its use in the governance literature on bureaucratic quality. Although a comprehensive review of these definitional and conceptual variations is be-

yond the scope of this article², most uses in the governance literature are in the sense of what Mann (1984, 189) calls “infrastructural power”: “the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm.” Similarly, Skocpol (1985, 9) refers to “the ‘capacities’ of states to implement official goals, especially over the actual or potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socioeconomic circumstances.” The sprawling research program that has followed can be divided into roughly three streams, following Soifer (2008, 232): 1) research focused on the “capabilities of the central state”; 2) research focused on the state’s “territorial reach”; and 3) research that emphasizes the “effects of the state on society”. My focus in this article is on the first of these, since this meaning is most relevant for the issues of policy implementation and bureaucratic performance that are the main subject of this article.

Although the concept of state capacity originated in the macro-historical literature on state formation, it has been increasingly applied to questions of service delivery and policy implementation within the development and governance literatures. While different authors use different definitions, the common thread linking them is their emphasis on state capacity as a measure of *potential*. For instance, Besley and Persson (2011, 6) define state capacity as “the institutional *capability* of the state to carry out various policies that deliver benefits and services to households and firms”, Kaufmann *et al* (2010, 4) refer to “the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies”, and Centeno *et al* (2017, 3) study “the organizational

²See Soifer (2008) and Centeno *et al* (2017) for useful reviews.

and bureaucratic *ability* to implement governing projects” (emphasis added throughout).

For analysts who seek to explain or predict bureaucratic *action* - past, present, or future - this emphasis on measures of *potential* relies on implicit assumptions about the relationship between potential and action. In particular, potential and action can only be assumed equivalent to the extent that government bureaucracy can be modeled as a unitary agent implementing well-defined policy choices. Following the logic of constrained optimization, the bureaucracy is assumed to maximize the implementation of these policies subject to constraints of finite skills, knowledge, resources, and so on. This mental model of bureaucracy is analogous to simple economic models of firms’ production choices, in which a firm’s production possibility frontier represents possible solutions to the constrained optimization problem defined by its production function. Under these circumstances - when an organization can be thought of as maximizing output given a set of inputs - the metaphor of capacity is an accurate way to characterize governments’ ability to implement policy decisions. State capacity defines the frontier of combinations of public goods that could be produced, and politics is simply a matter of choosing a point along this frontier based on the political principal’s preferences and strategic calculations.

While most scholars of state capacity would recognize the reality of state bureaucracies to be more complicated than this simplistic characterization, the centrality of potential to the concept of state capacity is present even in its most nuanced treatments. For instance, Centeno *et al* (2017) distinguish organizational or state capacity from its political deployment, disaggregate

state capacity into three dimensions and four indicators, and recognize the specificity of certain forms of state capacity while arguing against “generic notions of state capacity” (25). While these distinctions are all important and useful, the core of the concept nonetheless remains that state bureaucracies can usefully be conceived as having potential capacities that can be separated from actual actions, politics, and contextual specificities.

3 Capacity in Applied Research

At the same time as state capacity was becoming a central issue in the study of long-term development, so too was capacity becoming an increasingly common analytical framework and theoretical reference point for scholars of bureaucratic performance and practitioners of institutional reform. Understanding bureaucratic (in)action as a matter of capacity was also convenient for these more applied purposes, in large part due to the concept’s malleability. Much like state capacity, capacity building as a concept has frequently been criticized for weak theoretical underpinnings, a range of definitions, and a tendency towards integrating a wide range of phenomena into a single term (Baser and Morgan 2008, Bockstael 2017). Capacity is used with reference to individuals, organizations, communities, systems, and nations alike (Ubels *et al* 2016). Brinkerhoff and Morgan write that “Exploring capacity can have an Alice-in-Wonderland feel: different definitions and models inhabit disjunctive realities where underlying assumptions are neither obvious nor transferrable. Like Alice, we wander through these worlds in varying states of befuddlement or irritation. As Morgan (2003, 1) notes, the concept of capacity ‘seems to

exist somewhere in a nether world between individual training and national development’.” (2010, 2) While not attempting a full survey of the literature on capacity building or policy implementation,³ this section discusses the prevalence of the concept of capacity not only in contemporary development practice but also in research on government performance and policy implementation, showing that it shares with the macro-historical literature on state capacity an emphasis on *potential* bureaucratic actions.

Certainly in financial terms, capacity building has become central to contemporary development practice, as “a quarter of the US \$55 billion of total Overseas Development Assistance is accounted for by support for capacity building” (World Bank 2016, 1), and Brinkerhoff and Morgan note that “Attention to capacity and capacity development (CD) has endured since the birth of international assistance” (2010, 2). Reforms conceived as capacity-building began in earnest in the 1970s, with donor-funded technical assistance programs that focused mainly on improving individual skills (Teskey 2012). Yet these individual-focused programs were widely perceived to have failed in their impact (OECD 2006). In response to these perceived failings, donors broadened the definition of capacity to include organizational and institutional factors over the course of the 1980s and 1990s (Teskey 2012).

This has led to understandings of capacity or capability that are so broad as to encompass virtually anything government or an organization does: “the *ability* of people, organisations and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully” (OECD 2006, 12); the “*potential* to perform” (Horton *et al* 2003, 18); “the *ability* of a human system to perform, sustain itself and

³See Baser and Morgan (2008) for a review.

self-renew” (Ubels *et al* 2010); and “the *ability* of an organization to equip, enable, and induce their agents to do the right thing at the right time to achieve a normative policy objective” (Andrews *et al* 2017, 95; emphasis added throughout). Despite the breadth of these definitions - and as with state capacity in the macro-historical literature - the common thread of these definitions is their emphasis on the *potential* of bureaucracies to achieve certain objectives.

The use of capacity as a framing device and organizing concept extends beyond development practice into academic research. For example, Brieba (2018) studies the evolution of Argentina and Chile’s performance on infant and maternal mortality indicators, and finds that “investments in state capacity” - used synonymously with development of the health system - were key to Chile’s superior performance. An *et al* (2017) examine how various “capacity factors” affect the delivery of urban infrastructure in India. There is also a large literature on the development of “community capacity” to resolve governance challenges (e.g. Moreno *et al* 2017).

Capacity’s appeal as a conceptual framework for applied policy and academic research derives in large part from its practical and political usefulness, in three senses. First, unnuanced readings of capacity see it as a way to compress many potential dimensions of organizational performance into a unidimensional concept that an organization can simply have more or less of. Second, capacity is defined as a state’s ability to implement policies - not just policies that are currently being implemented, but also hypothetical future policies. In this sense it is an essentially *predictive* concept: if a hypothetical policy were to be adopted, would it be implemented by the

bureaucracy? This not only corresponds to the practical interests of bureaucrats and donors, but also neutralizes political disagreements about what government should be doing. Third, capacity as a concept is useful because it creates a simple *target for reform* that is policy-neutral and apolitical. This makes it possible to discuss making changes to state structures and processes without being seen to be intervening in political arenas. Given this appeal it is not surprising that policymakers and academics alike have adopted the concept so readily, but does this conception of states as having bureaucratic capacity that can be politically deployed accurately depict the mechanisms of bureaucratic action and behavior?

4 Bureaucracies Are Collective Actors

States are composed of bureaucracies, or organizations, and organizations are collectivities of individuals. These individuals can be said to possess specific capacities, or (setting aside the many different types of skills and knowledge) some overall level of capacity. But there is no theoretical grounding for the assumption that the capacities of these individuals aggregate in any direct way to some collective organizational capacity.⁴ Indeed, a central theme of organization theory and organizational economics is that the collective nature of organizations introduces inefficiencies and complementarities, and thus organizations cannot be understood simply as the sum of their individual members. To adapt Cyert and March's famous quote about the incoherence

⁴While most scholars of state capacity would acknowledge that organizational capacity is not a simple aggregation of individual skills, it is nevertheless sometimes operationalized that way in practice (e.g. Gingerich 2013, Bersch *et al* 2016).

of the idea of organizational goals: people (i.e., individuals) have capacities; collectivities of people do not.

There are three sets of collective problems that undermine the analytical coherence of capacity as a concept for organizational analysis. First, there are simple problems of information and incentives that undermine individuals' ability to collaborate efficiently within organizations. Second, there are problems of the allocation of individual capacity within and across organizations. Third, and most importantly, there are more complex problems of relational contracts and organizational culture that introduce the potential for multiple equilibria in organizational performance. While the first and second sets imply that there may be only a weak correlation between organizational performance and individual members' capacities, the third set makes the stronger argument that lack of individual capacity is unlikely even to be a binding constraint for most organizations.

The first set of (relatively simple) problems stems from the idea that individual capacity centers on an individual's ability to complete a given task, but in organizations these individuals face the additional challenge of coordinating their activities with each other. Garicano and Rayo (2016, 138-9) neatly summarize the challenges imposed by the multiplicity of agents:

“Agents fail to act together because they do not want to (an incentive problem) or they do not know how to (a bounded-rationality problem). Incentive problems arise due to the presence of asymmetric information or imperfect commitment, which lead agents to act according to their own biases or preferences rather than in

the interest of the organization (e.g., Holmstrom 1979; Shavell 1979). Bounded-rationality problems arise due to agents' cognitive limitations and finite time, which means that even if they want to, agents cannot compute the solution to every problem, nor can they make themselves precisely understood by others. . . ."

The stronger these incentive and bounded rationality problems are, the more that the organizations' ability to resolve these problems will dominate the capacities of the individual agents in the determination of overall productivity. These problems are likely to be especially severe in the public sector, where outputs and outcomes are non-priced and often difficult to measure and managers' ability to design and implement incentive schemes is typically constrained by statute and by politics (Wilson 1989).

The second set of issues, on the allocation of individual capacity, arises from the *complementarities* inherent in team production. If every worker in a team needs to perform a component of a task successfully in order for the overall task to be achieved, then the relationship between individual capacity and team performance is multiplicative rather than separately additive. These complementarities are pervasive in bureaucracies, particularly in the public sector. Many outputs take the form of joint team production within or across organizations, as when individuals from various units give inputs to different aspects of a permit decision or policy document. In addition, many public sector outputs require authorization from a sequence of individuals whose actions are informed not only by different mandates but also different levels of individual capacity. The implication of these types of joint or se-

quential production processes for bureaucracies is that increased individual capacity within one area of the organization - or one organization within the broader government - is unlikely to translate into a one-for-one improvement in overall performance, and may sometimes be entirely disconnected from it.

The third set of reasons for the disconnect between individual capacities and organizational performance centers on *relational contracts* and *organizational culture* within the organization, which can lead to multiple equilibria in organizational performance. These theories derive from the observation that many important aspects of organizational functioning are not formalizable and rely instead on informal understandings among members of the organization (Gibbons and Henderson 2013). This incompleteness implies the need for agents to retain some level of discretion, but discretion is a dual-edged sword: it can enhance efficiency for all parties, but can also be abused by actors for short-term private gain. The management of discretion is therefore both technical – in the specification of tasks, contingencies, and the design of incentives – but also relational - in that it requires building shared expectations, understandings, and norms over time. This accretion of shared understandings and processes over time is also a feature of Nelson and Winter’s (1982) influential work on routines in organizations, and creates the potential for substantial long-term divergences in performance among organizations.

Needless to say, employee discretion is a salient feature of the public sector. Indeed, these relational aspects of management are likely to be even more important in public sector organizations than private sector ones, since the outputs of public sector organizations are often non-priced and/or dif-

difficult to measure (Wilson 1989, Prendergast 2003). The implication of the pervasive necessity for employee discretion in organizations is that all the formal aspects of management and policymaking that can be transported across organizations - standard operating procedures, remuneration and promotion schemes, descriptions of “best practices” - are not fully determinative of organizational performance. An implication of this is that two organizations that are identical in all formal aspects can exhibit major differences in performance of the same tasks, due to differences in how these informal, tacit understandings have developed among members of the organization.

There is considerable empirical evidence in support of the idea that *ex ante* identical organizations can exhibit large differences in performance. In developing country public sectors, the handful of quantitative studies that exist demonstrate large ranges of variation in performance within a given country’s government (Gingerich 2013; Rasul *et al* 2017), while a predominantly case study-based literature demonstrates the existence of “islands of excellence” - effective organizations - in otherwise weak states (Tendler 1997, Leonard 2010). Numerous studies of private sector firms show large and persistent differences in productivity and management quality among organizations even within the same narrowly defined field (Gibbons and Henderson 2013), as well as in other fields such as hospitals (Carrera and Dunleavy 2013) and schools (Bloom *et al* 2014). These “persistent performance differences” among organizations appear to be the norm, not the exception, within organizational fields (Gibbons and Henderson 2013). The potential for organizations to operate inefficiently has long been a key theme in the study of organizations, as theorists questioned models of firms as perfectly

rational maximizers with concepts such as organizational slack (Cyert and March 1963), X-inefficiency (Leibenstein 1966), and organizational culture (Schein 1985). The potential for such variation in performance among public sector organizations is even greater, since there is no built-in mechanism for poorly performing government organizations to “exit” in the same way as inefficient firms.

The importance of relational contracts and organizational culture in organizations further weakens the usefulness of conceiving of government performance in terms of capacity. To the extent that these organization-specific relational factors matter for performance, improving performance becomes a question of *shifting equilibria* from an inefficient non-cooperative equilibrium to a more efficient cooperative one. Capacity may be a coherent way to understand individual actions given a set of incentives, but treating organizations as having capacity abstracts from the most salient mechanisms driving bureaucratic actions.

5 Bureaucracies Have Multiple Principals

State capacity is defined as the ability of government bureaucracies “to implement logistically political decisions” (Mann 1984, 189). Similarly, Skocpol (1985, 9) discusses the “the ‘capacities’ of states to implement official goals”, and Besley and Persson (2011, 6) define state capacity as “the institutional capability of the state to carry out various policies that deliver benefits and services to households and firms”. If a state has a capable bureaucracy, the logic goes, then it should be able to effectively implement the government’s

objectives, whatever they might be.

An implicit assumption in this is that governments *actually have* coherent and consistent goals that they can task an impartial bureaucracy to implement without further political contestation. This is only true if a government's goals are equivalent to those of a unitary actor - either because there is a clean separation between policy choice and policy implementation, so that all political disagreements are resolved at one stage and the resulting policy is implemented wholeheartedly, or because all decisions are taken by a dictator. Needless to say, neither of these conditions characterizes actually-existing governments. Much as Shepsle (1992) decried "legislative intent" to be an oxymoron by pointing out that "Congress is a 'they', not an 'it'", so too should scholars abandon the myth that the political process ordains coherent and consistent goals that bureaucracies could implement if only they were capable enough.

A more realistic approach would start from the recognition that government bureaucracies almost always have *multiple principals* (Wilson 1989, Dixit 1996), in the sense that their actions are directed and constrained by multiple actors, stakeholders, or objectives. These multiple principals are sometimes embodied in formal institutions, as when bureaucracies are accountable to both the executive and a legislature (as well as to audit institutions, finance ministries, procurement authorities, etc.). Multiple principals can equally be understood in a less formal sense, in that bureaucracies are informally accountable to a broad range of stakeholders: organized interest groups, the media, "public opinion", opposition political parties, professional bodies, service users, and so on. The very multiplicity of goals imposed on

public sector organizations - effectiveness, transparency, impartiality, representativeness, etc. - also creates opportunities for new actors to direct or constrain the organization. As Wilson (1989, 131) observed, “Every constraint or contextual goal is the written affirmation of the claim of some external constituency.”

Finally, and to further complicate matters, the relevant multiple principals can even be *internal* to a bureaucracy. Cyert and March’s (1963, 205-6) observation about firms is even more applicable to the public sector:

“We have argued that the business firm is basically a coalition without a generally shared, consistent set of goals. Consequently, we cannot assume that a rational manager can treat the organization as a simple instrument in his dealings with the external world. Just as he needs to predict and attempt to manipulate the ‘external’ environment, he must predict and attempt to manipulate his own firm. Indeed, our impression is that most actual managers devote much more time and energy to the problems of managing their coalition than they do to the problems of dealing with the outside world.”

This multiplicity of principals complicates the process of policy implementation, because each principal tries to influence *how* the policy is implemented throughout the implementation process. In other words, political contestation does not cease after the “decision” phase of policymaking. Whitford (2005, 45) describes the results of this “tug-of-war” on bureaucracies: “sequenced attempts by multiple, competing principals to obtain bureaucratic

compliance can whiplash agencies as they implement policies in the field. For agencies, this shifting of gears - accelerating or decelerating as political overseers demand - has substantial importance for administration..." The challenges imposed on public managers by these competing, unstable, and collectively incoherent political demands, and their negative impact on efficiency and policy implementation, has also been extensively documented in qualitative literature (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973, Wilson 1989).

Just as the fact of bureaucracies being collective rather than unitary actors suggests that capacity is a deeply flawed way to analyze organization's ability to implement policy, so too does the characteristic of having multiple principals undermine the idea that official policy goals are coherent and stable objectives for these bureaucracies to aim at. As a result, the bureaucratic actions or performance we observe is likely to be very different from the notional potential of that bureaucracy. Understanding policy implementation as a question of the capacity of public bureaucracies is therefore incomplete at best, and fundamentally misleading at worst. Yet if the concept of capacity is a poor way to analyze bureaucratic performance and policy implementation both at the level of government bureaucracies and at the level of political control of these bureaucracies, then how should scholars analyze bureaucracies and implementation instead?

6 Discussion: Beyond Capacity

It would be convenient if the appropriate response to the limitations of the capacity framework was simply to adopt a different term. However, the

limitations created by the concept's foundations in the idea of bureaucratic *potential* or *ability* are analytical, not semantic, and these cannot be addressed by simply substituting another catch-all term. Instead, there is a need for broader change in how scholars and practitioners think about policy implementation, bureaucratic performance, and reform. It is important to once again emphasize that these critiques and suggestions are not aimed at invalidating or replacing the macro-historical literature on state capacity or cross-country studies examining its relationship with aggregate socioeconomic outcomes. But as this research program has built increasingly compelling evidence that the quality of the state bureaucracy matters for such outcomes, scholars have rightly sought to answer questions that are increasingly specific to particular bureaucracies, policies, and contexts, and it is here that the limitations of capacity as a conceptual framework have become evident. While a comprehensive methodological discussion is in itself beyond the scope of any one article, this section sketches three non-mutually exclusive approaches that scholars and practitioners alike can - and in some cases, have already begun to - take.

6.1 Analyzing multiple actors and principals

First, research on organizational performance and reform can explicitly engage with the implications of bureaucracies being collective actors under multiple principals. Whereas the approach of state and organizational capacity is to acknowledge these complexities but subsume them into a single concept in search of conceptual simplicity (e.g. Centeno *et al* 2017, USAID

2017), an alternative approach is to center them in the analysis in order to understand how issues of collective action and collective choice shape organizational performance. As discussed in Section 4, the nature of organizations as comprising multiple actors implies three sets of challenges: problems of information and incentives; problems of the allocation of individual talent within organizations; and problems of organizational culture and relational contracts. All three provide opportunities for further research.

While many authors have studied the impact of different information, monitoring, and incentive schemes in the public sector, including through an increasing literature on field experiments (see various in Finan *et al* 2015), these are overwhelmingly conducted as problems of a single principal overseeing a single agent (or multiple agents who do not interact). Given the collaborative nature of many public sector tasks, and the organization-level evidence that issues of collaboration amongst agents within an organization are significant for performance (Rasul *et al* 2017), this is a significant gap - and opportunity for new research. Inspiration here can be drawn from the growing literature in private sector firms on team production (Bandiera *et al* 2009) and social incentives in organizations (Ashraf and Bandiera 2017).

Similarly, there has been little research on (sub-)optimal allocation of individual talent in the public sector. A rare partial exception is Khan *et al's* (2018) experimental work on rotating tax inspectors in Pakistan. While the authors' main goal is to examine whether such the rotation policy elicits additional effort, it illustrates the point that worker-job matching is a powerful determinant of performance. Once again, research on personnel allocation in the public sector can take inspiration from studies on private firms: for

example, Bandiera *et al* (2009) show that social connectedness of supervisors and workers on a farm has a significant impact on worker productivity. Empirical studies of relational contracts and organizational culture in government organizations are even rarer, although here the scope for positive gains is perhaps the largest. While organizational culture has long been cited as an important factor in organizational performance in developing countries (Grindle 1997), its qualitative importance has yet to be matched by quantitative studies of the impact of organizational culture on performance in public sector organizations.

The challenges imposed on public managers by the multiple principals' competing, unstable, and collectively incoherent political demands, and their relationship to efficiency and policy implementation, is another fruitful avenue for the study of bureaucracies in development. These dynamics have also been extensively documented in qualitative literature focused on US public administration (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973, Wilson 1989, Miller and Whitford 2016). More recently, quantitative research on policy implementation in developing countries has begun to explore similar themes (Gulzar and Pasquale 2017, Williams 2017), with implications for institutional design of accountability systems for bureaucrats and for delivery mechanisms for aid and inter-governmental transfers.

Understanding the implications of bureaucracies' multiple principals can also contribute to more precise analysis of the ways in which politics might affect policy implementation - both negative and positive - and improve the design of institutions meant to ameliorate these effects. Conceiving of bureaucracies as being pulled among multiple political principals makes reform

more difficult in some ways, by increasing the number of constraints on bureaucracies - a perspective taken by applied literature on political economy analysis in aid delivery (DFID 2009). Yet it also emphasizes the potential scope for bureaucratic autonomy to have significant positive effects on the policy process (Miller and Whitford 2016), and the importance of finding creative ways for the leaders of these bureaucracies to carve out autonomy (Carpenter 2001). Recognizing the limitations of capacity for thinking about bureaucratic performance, policy implementation, and reform thus opens up avenues for future research and policy innovation that are both practical and theoretically well-grounded.

6.2 Engaging with specificity and contingency

A second way in which scholars can make their analysis better suited to the realities of policy implementation is to engage directly with the complexity and uncertainty of policy implementation, which are not well represented by a single construct like capacity at the national, sub-national, or even organizational level. By asking specific questions about the likely outcomes of specific bureaucracies implementing specific policies in specific contexts, scholars and reformers alike can better understand and predict policy implementation and identify specific levers for meaningful improvement. The importance of these contextual specificities and contingencies becomes clear as abstract discussions of state or organizational capacity are narrowed to specific policy questions, as the two cases below illustrate.

First, in research on post-conflict security, agreement implementation,

and policing - a topic which has spawned a significant literature of cross-country research (Englehart 2009; Cole 2015) and case studies (Hills 2007, Baker 2009) and which is central to theories of the long-term development of state capacity - a slippage between the macro-historical and development practice conceptions of capacity is often especially apparent. For example, Hills (2007, 405) states that “Police governance is analysed in terms of institutional capacity and technical proficiency”, Baker (2009, 184) defines “government capacity” as “the degree of capacity to provide state policing and to regulate, audit, and facilitate other policing agencies”, and Cole (2015) emphasizes that states are not unitary actors but goes on to study treaty enforcement as a matter of state capacity. The reductive framing of the political and bureaucratic determinants of government action as matters of capacity is often even more stark from practitioners. For example, Friedman’s study of post-conflict policing in Liberia (2011, 13) quotes a “deputy UNMIL police commissioner, [who] said he thought the police possessed ‘a significant level of capacity and promise,’ including a group of mid-level managers with six or seven years of experience that had the skills and integrity to step into the role of inspector general. However, he was critical of the high-level political appointees because such appointments raised the possibility of political meddling and because several appointees had little policing expertise. He said, ‘It’s a contradiction to try and build police capacity when the top level has no police capacity.’ ”

For academics and practitioners alike in the study of post-conflict security, then, the slippage of the concept of capacity from its macro-historical origins to its application to specific policies and organizations to to individual

bureaucrats can mask a far more complex range of processes and outcomes. However, the potential for more nuanced theoretical approaches to provide new insight by disaggregating these analyses is illustrated by Medie’s (2018, 137) study of post-conflict police reform in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, which “demonstrates that even in the most unlikely of contexts the formal institutions of the state can be made to work in order to deliver better outcomes for marginalised groups”. By analyzing the nuances of domestic political coalitions and heterogeneity among government agents in these two contexts that would be generally considered to have relatively low state capacity, Medie is able to not only uncover unexpected policy implementation outcomes but also explain them and their implications for reformers in other contexts.

Second, the case of the failed launch of the healthcare.gov website in the United States provides an even sharper contrast between the abstract generality of state capacity and the highly contingent nature of actual policy implementation. The US federal government would be judged as high capacity by any measure and the website was delivering on a top political priority, yet the launch was a dismal failure due to a combination of technical complexity, poor project management, unrealistic politically driven timelines, ineffectual risk analysis, and poor coordination among stakeholders (Anthopolous *et al* 2016). These can be understood in the context of the multiple agent and multiple principal theories of bureaucracy discussed in Sections 4 and 5. Although the government had many individuals with appropriate technical skills (and had the resources to hire many others), implementation was characterized by the inefficient allocation of this individual capacity across government, by coordination failures, and by hierarchical working norms that

were inappropriate for such a complex project - problems imposed by the collective nature of bureaucracies. Similarly, fragmented authority across within the government meant that “key decisions were often delayed, guidance to contractors was inconsistent, and nobody was truly in charge. Government employees appear to have concealed critical information from each other. . .” (Thompson 2013) - all manifestations of the multiple principal character of public sector organizations. While the US state might have high capacity in a broad, aggregate, cross-national sense, numerous studies of policy implementation in the US emphasize how complexity and contingency can be even more powerful determinants of policy implementation (e.g. Pressman and Wildavsky 1973).

6.3 Measuring performance, not capacity

A final implication of this paper’s argument is that theory and measurement should clearly distinguish between performance and capacity when studying state bureaucracies. The two terms (along with others like effectiveness or quality) are often used interchangeably. For instance, the influential Worldwide Governance Indicators’ measure of Government Effectiveness is listed as an indicator of the “capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies” (Kaufmann 2010, 4).

However, the distinction between the two terms is an important one: whereas bureaucratic performance can be measured directly, capacity can only be measured in hypothetical terms. Whereas performance is a *retrospective* measure of bureaucratic quality, capacity is a *prospective* measure.

Performance aims to measure what actions or outcomes a bureaucracy actually produced in the past, whereas capacity aims to measure the ability to implement hypothetical policies in the future. Not only is the latter inherently speculative, but it is also highly dependent on the specific details of the future hypothetical policy. To accurately predict the implementation of a future policy one must not only specify the policy, but also the other contingent circumstances surrounding the implementation. In contrast, measuring performance is free from such hypotheticals, measuring what the bureaucracy actually did than what it might do.

A second reason why performance can be measured more directly than capacity stems from the argument articulated in Section 4: that discussing the capacity of bureaucracies requires implicitly or explicitly treating them as unitary rather than collective actors, whereas individual capacities combine to determine organizational actions and outcomes in complex and unpredictable ways. In contrast, these actions and outcomes themselves - the constituent elements of bureaucratic performance - can be measured regardless of how they compare to the hypothetical capacity of the organization and its individuals. While there are numerous practical and political challenges associated with measuring the performance of public bureaucracies (Wilson 1989), these same challenges are equally applicable to attempts to measure capacity, and measuring performance at least has the advantage of conceptual clarity.

In addition to guiding future research, the distinction between performance and capacity is important for the design of reforms, especially when combined with a view of bureaucracies as collective actors. The relationship

between individual skill development and improved performance in collective actors such as bureaucracies is far from direct - not only does investing in skills that might only potentially be used create waste, but performance and policy implementation are determined in large part by unformalizable and relational aspects of organizational functioning which can only be put in place and improved through actual practice. Investing in potential capacities is therefore likely to be ineffective unless they are actualized.

This implies a greater focus on improving team dynamics and organizational culture through learning-by-doing - the types of activities which in the private sector, as Teskey (2012, 1) astutely notes, are simply called “business management” rather than capacity building. While many donor capacity building programs are designed with an awareness of the importance of organizational and institutional factors in bureaucracies’ performance, the most commonly used approach to capacity building in practice has remained individualized skill development through trainings and workshops, despite the skepticism of these very practitioners about the usefulness of such approaches (USAID 2017). However, this may be beginning to change. For example, USAID has recently begun to shift the focus of its program measurement away from measures of capacity and towards performance, writing: “Capacity is a form of potential; it is not visible until it is used. Therefore, performance is the key consideration in determining whether capacity has changed” (2017, 5).

7 Conclusion

Despite the contributions of state capacity to research on the long-run and comparative development of state bureaucracies, the analytical usefulness of capacity is limited for understanding the performance, implementation, and reform of specific bureaucracies or policies. The metaphor of capacity obscures the salient fact that bureaucracies are collective actors operating under the direction of multiple political principals, not unitary actors carrying out well-defined policies. As a result of this multiplicity of agents and principals, understanding failures of service delivery or policy implementation requires analyzing these problems of coordination, collective action, and collective choice that theories of capacity subsume into one summary concept.

Building on this critique, this paper has suggested three methodological implications for the analysis of bureaucratic performance and policy implementation in specific contexts. First, analysis should focus explicitly on the problems created by bureaucracies being collective actors under multiple principals, rather than seek to abstract from them. Second, analysts should engage directly with contextual specificities and contingencies. Third, measurement and reform should focus on retrospective performance, not hypothetical capacity. Connecting the macro-historical and cross-country literature on state capacity to studies that do engage with these more precise mechanisms and contextual specificities presents both challenges and opportunities for understanding the development of effective bureaucracies. While a handful of existing studies do seek to bridge these levels of scale (e.g. Carpenter 2001, Miller and Whitford 2016, Ang 2017), there is a need for more

such work - especially in developing country contexts.

Research on the development and performance of government bureaucracies has made impressive progress in the three decades since works like Mann (1984) and Skocpol (1985) began to make it a key research question for social science, and much of this progress has been made under the banner of state capacity. To translate this general understanding into analysis and reform of specific bureaucracies and their policies will require moving beyond the broad concept of state capacity and disaggregating rather than subsuming the complexities of public bureaucracies. Fortunately, many of the theoretical and methodological building blocks for this approach already exist within political science, organization theory, and organizational economics, and much can be drawn from the more theoretically and empirically nuanced studies of state capacity that already exist. Unfortunately, even the most sophisticated models only begin to make sense of the complexity of state bureaucracies, as numerous efforts at reform have discovered the hard way. Integrating these insights into theory and empirics on policy implementation and reform - and working with policymakers to test them - represents a rich and potentially transformative research agenda.

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